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REVERSE-COST-SHIFTING: A NEW
PROPOSAL FOR ALLOCATING
LEGAL EXPENSES
EPHRAIM FISCHBACH* AND WILLIAM MCLAUCHLAN*

Abstract
The two traditional mechanisms for allocating the costs of litigation, the American and European rules, have been extensively studied
in terms of their impact on litigation. This analysis proposes a third
alternative, the reverse-cost-shifting (RCS) rule. In contrast to the
American rule (where each party pays its own costs), and the European rule (where the losing party pays at least some of the winner's
costs), RCS imposes on the losing party a penalty determined by its
own costs, which is paid directly to the court. Using a formal analytic
model, the comparative consequences of the three allocation rules are
assessed in terms of their impact on the decision to litigate. It is
shown that among the three rules, RCS provides the strongest deterrent against a party over-investing in its case, particularly if that case
is weak. This has significant policy implications for controlling the
growth of litigation costs. These and other policy questions are discussed in some detail.
INTRODUCTION

This analysis explores a topic that has been widely treated with
varying results and conclusions. The allocation of attorneys' fees
and other costs of litigation is an important consideration for potential litigants and others using dispute resolution processes, and it is
a concern for the judicial system generally. 1
* Professor of Physics, and Associate Professor of Political Science, Purdue University, respectively. We thank Michelle Parry for assistance with the
numerical results. We are also indebted to Daniel Bernstein, the Hon. Gregory
Donat, the Hon. Michael Gery, Richard Meister, Michael Morin, and John
Scheid for helpful discussions, and to Judy Hanks and Nancy Schnepp for
assistance in manuscript preparation.
1. The literature on the subject of attorneys' fees is voluminous. Only the
major works will be cited here but these, along with the sources cited in them,
provide a comprehensive treatment of the scholarly literature. Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Harold F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin
of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, MeritoriousSuits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 371 (1996); Donald N. Dewees et al., An Economic Analysis of Cost
and Fee Rules for Class Actions, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1981); John J. Donohue
III, Commentary-Optingfor the European Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1093 (1991); William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee in
Class Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1994); Thomas J. Miceli, Do
Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 211 (1994);
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This subject has also been of interest to various scholars over
recent decades because of questions relating to the increase in litigation in this country and the impact of this increase on our judicial
system. In addition, there is growing interest in the impact of cost
allocation on the decisions that disputants make. While this inquiry
will not treat the entire subject, it will provide an alternative rule
for allocating litigation costs and attorneys' fees, and it will compare the prominent allocation rules using a new analytic approach.
With some variation, there are two primary allocation formulas
that have drawn most of the scholarly and policy attention. The
first is the American rule which, in its purest form, requires each
party to pay its own costs no matter the outcome of the dispute or
contest. That is, irrespective of how the dispute is resolved-settlement or judgment-and no matter who prevails-plaintiff or defendant-the costs of litigating lie where they fall. Without regard
to the amount paid or to the source of the payment, winners pay
their own costs and the losers pay theirs. The other rule is usually
called the European (or British) rule, and it results in some distribution of costs from the losing party in the case to the winner
(either the loser pays all the costs of the winner or some portion
thereof). The European rule is designed both to impose an additional sanction on the losing party for initiating or defending a case
without merit and to make the winner "whole."2 The European rule
provides the prevailing party with additional compensation, so that
its "winnings" do not have to be devoted to the contest.
In addition to the American and European rules for allocation,
legislatures and courts in this country have developed other allocation rules relating to specific kinds of litigation. In fact, the American rule has been altered by a number of federal statutes that
provide numerous opportunities for the "prevailing party" to collect
Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93
(1986); Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee, and FinancingRules on the Development of the Substantive
Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451 (1988); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial:
A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods of the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); see Symposium Attorney Fee Shifting, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1984) (containing a number of qualitative and formal

analyses of "Attorney Fee Shifting" subjects). See also Robert D. Cooter &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution,
27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989) (discussing the broader issues that relate to questions involving the economic analysis of legal disputing, settlement, and the
broader subject of law and economics); Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
457 (1993); George L. Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation:
An Economic Analysis, SUP. CT. ECON. REV. Vol. I, (Peter Aronson, ed. 1983);
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
2. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, DUKE L.J. 651 (1982).
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"reasonable attorneys' fees."'3 These provisions have led to a good
deal of litigation and judicial modification. 4 Such two-way cost
shifting provisions allow for the courts to determine when a party is
the "prevailing party."5 The determination of what constitutes "reasonable" attorneys' fees also provides room for judicial modification
of the statutory allocation rule.6 The bulk of these laws change the
American rule into some form of the European rule by requiring the
losing party to reimburse the winning party for attorneys' and other
fees.
There are also common law examples of courts in the United
States modifying the American rule to impose the winning party's
attorneys' fees on the losing party. Some of these appear to involve
efforts to impose a punitive sanction on a party who takes and
maintains a frivolous or non-meritorious position in a case. 7 There
are also examples of courts imposing fees on the loser in order to
achieve the other objective of the European rule, namely, to make
the winner whole.
These variations from the American rule are generally two-way
fee shifting. That is, they allow the fees to be shifted from plaintiffs
to defendants as well as from defendants to plaintiffs. The only
factor determining the direction of the shift is that it occurs from
the loser to the winner. In contrast, one-way fee shifting works from
only one party (usually the defendant) when it loses to the other
(often the plaintiff) when it wins.8 This examination focuses on a
different kind of shifting, but it can be classified as two-way since
the discussion relates to the possibility that whichever party loses
will be held responsible for fees.
3. Various compilations of the statutory provisions in the United States
Code include Aleyska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61

(1975);

JEFFREY GOODSTEIN, ATTORNEY'S FEES: WINNING A RECOVERY IN FED-

ERAL COURT

(1985).

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) provides:
b) ATTORNEY'S FEES: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision.

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the

United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
c) EXPERT FEES: In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of this
section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision ... the court, in
its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of this statute has evolved a good deal,
and it illustrates several elements of judicial interpretation and discretion regarding this matter. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992); see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Farrar,506 U.S. at 103; Burlington v. Daque, 505 U.S. 557
(1992); and Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Keytronics Corp. v. U.S., 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
7. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
8. See The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1671 for an example of a one-way fee shifting rule. This is not a purely one-way provision since
the allocation of fees can go either way, but it does illustrate differential treatment of plaintiff and defendant in allocation mechanisms.
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These fee allocation rules have consequences for the two primary choices that are made by disputants: (1) the decision to litigate (initiating or defending against a suit) and (2) the decision to
settle (bargaining or compromising) or litigating to a conclusion
once the case has been initiated. 9 The consequences of these rules
arise from the fact that the costs each party incurs influence its decision regarding whether to litigate, i.e., initiate a law suit, and
then whether to take the case to judgment or settle via negotiation.
These allocation mechanisms have been explored by a variety of
scholars, and various statutory modifications to each of these rules
have been made in order to adjust outcomes and consequences. 10
The analysis presented here seeks to accomplish two objectives
that differ from prior research. First, a new allocation rule is developed and analyzed. The objectives of this rule differ from the goals
of both the American and European rules. While this rule may seem
out of the ordinary in the American context, it produces results that
may be beneficial for the judicial process in this country. Furthermore, the consequences of this rule are different from the two traditional rules of fee allocation. This analysis will compare the
existing paradigms for allocating the cost of litigation with this proposed alternative. The research builds on the earlier work of other
authors, and places this third allocation rule in the context of existing models, with rather striking results.
Second, this analysis compares the three cost allocation rules
that are discussed using a new framework. Much of the prior research has treated the probability of winning (or losing) as though
it can be objectively determined, is known (and is constant) to everyone, or is unilaterally within each party's control. 1 ' It is usually
also assumed that the probability of winning a suit is a fixed, deter9. 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) provides:
In any action under this section the court may, in the interest of justice, award the costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expert witnesses fees, to a prevailing plaintiff. Such court may, in

the interest of justice award such costs to a prevailing defendant whenever
such action is unreasonable, frivolous, or meritless. For purposes of this

subsection a reasonable attorney's fee is a fee (1) which is based upon (A)

the actual time expended by an attorney in providing advice and other legal
services in connection with representing a person in an action brought
under this section, and (B) such reasonable expenses as may be incurred by
the attorney in the provision of such services, and (2) which is computed at

the rate prevailing for the provision of similar services with respect to actions brought in the court which is awarding such fee.
See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 1 (indicating the nature of the

analysis that accompanies these two questions). See also Note, An Analysis
of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67 (1969); see also Shavell, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 1; see also Ronald Braeutigam et al., An
Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173 (1984).
11. But see Bruce Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29 (1995).
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minable value (between 0.0 and 1.0). However, it is much more realistic to view this probability as a function which depends on a
variety of factors, some of which each party can control. In the following analysis, the probability P of the plaintiff winning, and the
probability P of the defendant prevailing, will be treated as functions, which depend on variables such as the investment made by
each side.
The research presented below is organized into several parts.
Section II presents an alternative fee-shifting model called the reverse-cost-shifting (RCS) rule. This presentation discusses the RCS
rule and a variety of substantive (policy) considerations that arise
from this proposal for allocating the costs of litigating. Section III
provides the formal analysis of the RCS rule and compares the consequences of the American, European, and RCS cost allocation
schemes. This assessment of the three rules and their consequences
is presented in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and in the
context of a more sophisticated and formal model. Additionally, this
article illustrates the impact of the RCS rule using several examples. Section IV outlines what the RCS rule can be expected to
achieve in comparison with the American and the European rules.
This provides a clear sense of the relative features of these three
rules. Section V concludes the analysis and raises several important policy considerations for future research.
II.

FORMULATION OF THE REVERSE-COST-SHIFTING PROPOSAL

A.

The Reverse-Cost-Shifting Rule

In this section, a detailed formulation of the (RCS) rule is
presented. The purposes and consequences of RCS differ from those
of the American or European rules discussed in the previous section, and these differences will be further explored in Sections III
and IV below. The rule in its simplest form is as follows:
In civil actions, the losing side pays a multiple of its
own costs to the court.
This multiple, called the compensation factor (C), would be fixed by
law in each jurisdiction. In the simplest case, where C = 1, the
losing side would pay to the court a fine or "user's fee" exactly equal
to its own expenses. This rule is referred to as reverse-cost-shifting
since the penalty levied against the losing side is determined by the
expenditures of the losing side, rather than by the expenses of the
winning side as under the European rule.
The RCS rule is quite different from either the American or European rules, although it shares some features with each. In qualitative terms, the RCS rule aims to discourage a party (either
plaintiff or defendant) whose case is weak from pursuing its case
through litigation. The deterrence is provided by the prospect of an
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additional penalty which would be levied against the losing party,
as under the European rule. However, in contrast to the European
rule, the penalty is determined by the loser's own expenses. This
has the effect of encouraging each party to limit its investment in
its own case. The quantitative results presented in Section III below suggest that in practical terms the effect of RCS would be to
encourage each party to invest resources in a case only to the point
where this investment increases its expected gain. Any additional
investment is discouraged, as it increases each party's penalty
should it lose while not materially contributing to it's probability of
winning.
The RCS rule also differs from the European rule in having the
penalty paid to the court rather than to the winner. Thus RCS
shares with the American rule the provision that the winning party
recovers only the value of the judgment - not its legal expenses.
The reasons for having the court receive the penalty are detailed
below.
The purpose of the RCS rule is to affect the strategic behavior
of each party (their decisions and choices about litigating a case)
just as any allocative rule does. 12 One of the significant features of
RCS is that it does not allocate resources between litigants, as is the
case under the European rule. Nonetheless, the rule is still allocative or distributive in its effect, since it assesses litigation costs
against the losing party in each case, as does the European rule.
Notwithstanding their differences, the American, European,
and RCS rules share the assumption that courts function effectively
and rationally to settle conflicts or disputes. The mechanism
through which RCS acts to discourage non-meritorious or "frivolous" lawsuits (see Section III below), depends on the assumption
that the courts will make rational, predictable decisions based on
the objective merits of each party's case. This assumption seems defensible for purposes of this analysis, even though courts may serve
other functions as well.
In addition to assuming that courts resolve disputes, an assumption should be made that the litigants and their attorneys act
rationally. This is particularly the case for RCS where each party
must assess its probability of winning, as discussed in more detail
below. Thus, RCS encourages more thoughtful estimates of the
risks and the likelihood of prevailing by attorneys and clients at all
stages in the litigation process. This undoubtedly requires more
careful consideration of the arguments advanced by attorneys, and
12. This analysis treats only the decision to litigate, not the related decision
whether to litigate or settle a dispute. However, RCS does affect the decision to
litigate or settle, just as any cost allocation system would.
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the provision of more information to litigants than might now occur.
It is also likely to increase the control a litigant has over a case.
Furthermore, under RCS, lawyers would likely be pressed by
their clients to calculate the risks (probability) of losing or prevailing in the suit more accurately. This may already be done in some
cases, although indications from current litigation and strategic behavior suggest that such calculations are often casual, not considered seriously, inaccurately optimistic, or even non-existent for
some litigants. 13 The prevailing American rule encourages imprecise calculations, perhaps even wildly inflated guesses - about the
chances of winning.
It is also often the situation that the purpose of filing a complaint is merely to increase the pressure on the opposing side to
bargain. Such cases clog the courts and are not prosecuted because
the plaintiffs do not intend to prosecute. This type of strategic be14
havior could be discouraged or penalized under the RCS rule.
The RCS rule would reduce the number of cases initiated in the
courts, or brought to a conclusion through litigation. The rule
would accomplish this through the imposition of additional, and
perhaps very significant, costs on parties if they do not carefully
calculate litigation strategies and case development efforts. In particular, frivolous suits or highly risky claims of various kinds would
be discouraged. This should produce benefits to the judicial system,
the government generally, and society at large, in the form of less
litigation over non-meritorious claims.
One of the unique features of this proposal is that the costs are
paid to the court, rather than to the winning party. This underwrites the public's costs of maintaining a public dispute resolution
system (the courts). The "users" of the system directly pay at least
some of the costs of maintaining the system under this rule.
In contrast to the European rule, the objective of the RCS rule
is not to make the winner whole, to reward the winning party for
litigating or for maintaining its position, or to redound to the benefit of the prevailing party. Rather, its purpose is to deter the losing
party from litigating or persisting in litigation that has little or no
merit. That purpose is served by making the judicial system the
recipient of the allocation. The courts can be viewed as a public
good and as an essential part of governance. However, the judicial
13. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE: WHAT AMERICANS WANT
FROM THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND WHY (1985) (discussing plaintiffs' calculations of
fees). See also JONATHAN HARR, A CIvIL ACTION (1995).
14. This might be called the "run it up the flagpole and see" strategy. Such

an assessment of the merits of a case is really a non-calculation, since the litigant/attorney is simply willing to contest the issue with no idea of the likelihood
of success. The hope of this litigation strategy is to get "something" from the
other party, through either the threat of litigating, bargaining to a compromise
result, or litigating to a judgment.
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system incurs substantial resource costs from being "open" for lawsuits. Under RCS some of the costs that litigants impose on the
system for frivolous or questionable lawsuits, are paid by the losing
parties rather than by general tax revenues.
There is an additional reason why the losing party pays the
court under RCS, rather than the winning party as under the European rule. Suppose an alternative rule exists, called RCS2, which is
the same as RCS except that the loser pays the winner rather than
the court. Under RCS2 an individual who prevailed in a suit
against a large corporation could reap an undeserved "windfall" as
the recipient of the losing party's RCS penalty. This windfall would
be the difference between the winner's actual costs and the (presumably much larger) costs of the loser in such a case. The potential for such a windfall might even encourage certain kinds of
litigation, rather than discourage litigation which is the primary
objective of RCS. Since there is no overarching societal benefit that
results from having the RCS2 penalty paid to the winning party in
such a circumstance, the most obvious recipient is the court system
itself, as in RCS. Hence by having the penalty paid to the court,
RCS not only supports the courts, but also discourages litigation
whose primary purpose would be to reap a windfall that might result under RCS2.
B.

Possible Exceptions to Reverse-Cost-Shifting

Since the RCS rule shares with the European rule the feature
that a penalty is levied against the losing party, it is appropriate to
consider some exceptions which are suggested by the European experience. These exceptions involve either certain types of parties or
certain kinds of cases.
1) Non-monetary cases. A general exception could be made for
cases where the underlying issue is one of "equity" rather than
money. Examples of this might include child custody, immigration,
desegregation cases, or any other action where the requested remedy is equitable. The reason for making this exception is that the
RCS rule presumes that each party will be discouraged from pursuing a weak or non-meritorious case when the party decides that it
stands to lose more money than it will gain. Unless the outcome of
a case can be expressed as an expected monetary gain or loss, the
motivation behind the RCS rule is absent, and the rule would not
have the intended effects. Furthermore, cases of this sort involving
qualitative outcomes may be socially desirable, and should not be
deterred by a cost allocation rule such as RCS.
2) Sovereign immunity. The RCS penalty could be waived if the
losing party is any governmental unit or agency. The rationale for
this exception is that by imposing a fine on the government (when it
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is the losing party) one would merely be transferring funds from
one governmental unit to another (the court), and this serves no
societal purpose. Moreover, waiving the RCS penalty in such a circumstance would not eliminate the deterrence against overinvestment provided by RCS, since governmental budgets are always
limited, and are also subject to public scrutiny. In any event, the
winning party is not disadvantaged under such an exception, since
they are not the recipients of the penalty under RCS. This contrasts with the situation under the European rule, where an analogous exception would penalize the winning party by depriving it of
the compensation for legal expenses which might otherwise have
been received.
3) Legal-Aid clients. Since Legal-Aid may be funded from governmental sources or private charities, this penalty could be waived
in such cases for reasons similar to those discussed in 2) above.
Stated another way, since the litigant is using the litigation resources of a public third party, the RCS penalty would not act as a
deterrent to this litigant or this litigation.
4) "Sui generis" cases. The philosophy behind RCS is that society should discourage litigation in circumstances where one or the
other side is presumed to know that it has a weak case. When a
unique or broad new legal issue is brought to the courts, the RCS
penalty seems inappropriate, because neither party can calculate
the probability of winning, or the costs of winning. Furthermore,
society derives a general benefit from such litigation-the clarification of a legal principle or the development of a legal rule. Litigation of this sort should not be discouraged.
5) Resolution of judicialconflicts. Litigation which has as one of
its purposes the resolution of a conflict among the circuits, or
among decisions handed down by different courts, could serve the
public interest. In such cases the RCS penalty can be waived. Moreover, both the qualitative and quantitative features of RCS presume that each party has a basis for assessing how strong a case it
has. When an issue arises over which the courts themselves disagree, the imposition of a penalty on the losing side would seem
inappropriate.
6) Writs of habeas corpus. Such petitions arise from criminal
prosecutions and hence can be viewed as particular examples of
"non-monetary" cases discussed in 1) above. Furthermore, the petitioners in these cases (prisoners) may be "judgment-proof' and thus
have nothing to lose, even under the RCS rule. The nature of these
proceedings - the validity of the incarceration - also seems to
mitigate against imposing a cost penalty on the losing party (petitioning prisoner or responding jailer). On the other hand, the state
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may wish to impose an RCS penalty in the form of a nominal flat
fee, to discourage frivolous habeas corpus petitions.
7) Mandatory no-fault proceedings. An example would be a nofault divorce where a court proceeding is mandated by law. Even
though there may be monetary issues at stake (e.g. property settlement and support), the fact that court proceedings are mandated in
such a case precludes the parties from avoiding a court appearance
even if they wished to do so. Under such circumstances it would
seem appropriate to waive the RCS penalty.
The preceding exceptions are flexible, in the sense that any or
all can be dropped, and others added, without changing the basic
operation of RCS as formulated in the rule. Since these exceptions
(and possibly others) will have an impact on general litigation patterns, by encouraging some kinds of litigation and discouraging
others, legislatures should consider such exceptions as important
policy issues from the outset, and in subsequent statutory adjustments or changes to the allocation policy.
C. Implementation of the Reverse-Cost-ShiftingRule
Although the RCS rule is straightforward, its practical implementation requires attention to several features. First, all the costs
incurred by the losing litigant must be included and calculated
under the RCS rule. This requires some changes in the current
process. This rule views the cost of litigation as the costs of the suit
imposed on the parties and their representatives. Furthermore,
the costs an attorney has in the case, even if there are no immediate
costs from filing the suit, must be reflected in the "costs" under this
rule. This means that even if the attorney only uses "free time," the
value of this time and other existing resources (e.g. clerical,
software, and office/library) would be accounted for in the cost assessment. Those costs must be itemized and paid in connection
with each case. Each suit an attorney files must be accounted for in
terms of the attorney's time and other resources that are used in
the process of that particular suit, no matter how small that cost is
to the attorney or the litigant. In short, this provision requires that
the real cost of the case be accounted for, rather than just the marginal cost of filing this particular case. A determination of the costs
under RCS might be fixed by statute if attorneys are unable to identify and specify costs in some situations.
Second, in addition to attorneys' actual costs, the costs of collecting evidence for the case must be clearly documented and included. Whether this is the cost of investigation time, witness fees,
or evidence analysis, all of these are real costs that determine the
quality of the case (the evidence) presented by each party. These
costs should provide an incentive for each party (and attorney) to
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incur only those evidence costs that increase the likely gain from
winning the case. Thus, evidentiary "overkill" and its expense
should be deterred by this rule. The analysis in Section III indicates how this consideration operates in connection with the RCS
rule, by determining when the attorney and client will decide not to
invest any more time and money in case development. This rule is
likely to make that point come earlier in the investment process, or
at the very least force the parties to calculate these costs more
carefully.
Evidence that is beyond a party's control, i.e., in the control of
the opponent or some third party, might be excluded from the cost
accounting. This provision may require petitioning the court to recognize the opponent's dilatory tactics or obfuscation of evidence
that is in their possession. It would also provide some incentive for
parties to specify their evidence requests precisely rather in general, "fishing-expedition" terms.
The cost of each piece of evidence should be calculated and accounted for in this system. That may seem unrealistic, but the
usual procedures involved in the development of evidence are well
known and could be documented with little difficulty. For certain
services or kinds of legal services, fees could be fixed by law or set
by a regulatory agency if the legislature determined that would best
serve the public's interests. This would mean that the costs for
some kinds of legal services might be known (i.e. fixed) for everyone
considering litigation. The reasons for such a public determination
of some costs (or determination in advance) include the difficulty of
establishing these in individual cases, the chance that some costs
could be avoided (not specified) by the loser or their attorney unless
required or set by law, and the recognition that some costs might be
common or universal regardless of the party, the lawyer, or the type
of case. The legislature could identify and specify such costs to ensure that parties could not avoid them. Such cost-setting might
also deter or encourage various decisions about initiating suit on
the part of attorneys and clients.
Third, the RCS rule requires the determination of winners and
losers in litigation. In some cases the winner is obvious from the
outcome, but in a variety of instances the outcome is not at all clear
or explicit. Since RCS applies only to those civil cases where monetary damages are being sought, it is reasonable to define "winning"
in terms of the fraction of the damages asked for that is actually
awarded by the court. 15 Hence a plaintiff who sues for $1,000, but is
15. A side consequence of the RCS rule would be that parties would tend to
specify damages more accurately rather than inflate their damage requests.
The reason for this is that inflated damages are more likely to result in a reduced (less than full) jury award. This outcome would result in the assessment
of some proportion of costs on the winning plaintiff because they did not win the
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awarded only $800, would be considered as an "80% winner and
20% loser" under this definition. Contrariwise, the defendant in
this case would be "20% winner and 80% loser." The plaintiff who
spent x dollars would thus pay 20% of the RCS penalty Cx, whereas
the defendant who spent y dollars would pay 80% of the RCS penalty Cy. This apportionment of the RCS penalties between plaintiff
and defendant could also operate when the legal system uses comparative negligence mechanisms.
The apportioning of legal costs in this manner assumes that
the plaintiff can in fact specify the damages he is seeking. This may
not always be the case initially if the amount of damages being
sought depends on facts which will only emerge later, either during
discovery or during the trial itself. However, at some stage in a trial
the plaintiff will presumably ask for a specific dollar amount, and
this amount (along with the actual court award) will then determine what fraction of the maximum RCS penalties the plaintiff and
defendant will pay.
In a case where the plaintiff sues the defendant under a
number of different theories, the disposition of each of these theories may be important for case law, but only the final monetary
award is relevant for determining the RCS penalty for each side.
Since the other consideration in determining the RCS penalty is the
amount sought by the plaintiff, the RCS mechanism discourages a
plaintiff from asking for a great deal more than he is likely to win,
or has actually suffered.16
When the parties settle rather than litigate to judgment, the
RCS rule could still be applied. This would result in an allocation of
the costs of settlement between both parties, depending on whether
the plaintiff settled for all or only a portion of what they originally
sought. 17 Thus, if the RCS rule were applied to these instances,
parties would be deterred from filing suit at all if they were merely
using the complaint to force the opponent to negotiate. Once the
case is filed in court, then any outcome would result in payment (by
one or both parties) of their costs to the court.
This segment of the administration of the rule is open to different interpretations, depending on what policy makers wish to
entire inflated damage claim. In short, this rule would encourage litigants to
specify damages more precisely in order to reduce the amount of potential cost
they may incur if the jury does not recognize or award them all they ask for.
16. This point should be emphasized in terms of the previously discussed
assumption that the judicial system works correctly to determine winners and
losers, or serves as an accurate backdrop for that determination.
17. Such an application of the RCS rule might encourage litigation and deter settlement since the costs of settling would be assessed against one or both
parties. However, it is possible that the bargained result could also include a
side agreement over the distribution of litigation costs, if the parties could
agree on some arrangement.
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achieve by the rule. If the rule is to deter litigation, then the rule
should be applied to settlements if they are filed as cases. If the
objective of the rule is to impose punishment on litigants who persist in a non-meritorious case, then RCS need not be applied to negotiated settlements that occur anytime before judgment, only to
cases litigated to judgment.
Fourth, consideration must be given to the operation of the
RCS rule when a trial outcome is appealed for alleged legal errors.
One alternative is to adopt the position that each appeal is a separate legal proceeding with its own winning and losing parties. A
party losing at the trial level, and at all appellate levels as well,
would be subject to a sequence of separate penalties under RCS.
Another alternative is to waive the RCS penalty for a party winning
at any level. Here the presumption is that if a party prevails at any
level, its case must have been sufficiently strong to render inappropriate the imposition of any additional penalties. It is difficult to
determine at this preliminary stage of analysis of the RCS rule,
whether the latter alternative would encourage or discourage appeals. On one hand a successful appeal could cancel any penalties,
in addition to reversing the judgment, so a losing party would be
encouraged to appeal. On the other hand, an unsuccessful appeal
could further add to the losing party's expenses, perhaps magnifying the costs significantly, thus deterring some questionable
appeals.
Finally, the payment of the penalties incurred by the losing
side under RCS raises some issues which require further elaboration. In order for the RCS rule to operate in the intended manner, it
is necessary that the losing party be capable of paying the mandated penalty. Unless the losing party is a prisoner or is represented by Legal-Aid, where an exception can be made, the fact that
this party is indigent cannot be an excuse for failing to pay the RCS
penalty. To ensure compliance with the RCS rule, each party could
be required to present to the court prior to trial a detailed accounting of its expenses up to that point, along with a bond in the amount
of those expenses. The additional expenses arising from the trial
itself could be handled in a similar manner later. An additional
benefit from having the courts be the recipients of the RCS penalty
is that they have both the incentive and the enforcement power
needed to ensure that the fine is actually paid.
An issue might then arise when the client is unable to post the
required bond using his own resources. An example is an indigent
plaintiff injured in a car accident suing the driver of the car and/or
the driver's insurance company. In such a circumstance an arrangement would already have to be made between the plaintiff
and lawyer to cover the legal expenses (a contingency-fee arrangement), even under the existing American rule. Under RCS, the ar-
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rangement would then be extended to deal with the payment of any
additional penalties mandated under the rule.
This naturally leads to the question of the role of contingencyfee schemes under the RCS rule. In a typical contingency-fee arrangement, a lawyer agrees to absorb all or part of the client's legal
expenses in exchange for a percentage of any judgment won. Under
RCS, this arrangement could be extended by having the lawyer
agree to assume responsibility for any RCS penalties, in exchange
for a higher percentage of the judgment. Guidelines for such arrangements could be specified by legislatures or by the appropriate
bar regulators, and these would allow the introduction of the RCS
rule to be accommodated within the framework of existing contingency practices.
Perhaps RCS could lessen the pressure to prohibit contingencyfee arrangements, which have become the targets of mounting criticism. 1 8 This criticism has its origin in the perception that contingency fees encourage frivolous or nuisance lawsuits directed at
large corporations, because these suits have some "value" to the client and attorney even when settled, rather than litigated. However,
under RCS non-meritorious lawsuits would be discouraged whether
or not contingency fees were allowed, and hence the desired end
could be achieved through an alternate route. This obviates the
need for reforming contingency-fee arrangements, which might be
very hard to achieve. 19 The implication of the European experience
is that it may be difficult to eliminate the effects of contingency-fee
practices, even if such arrangements were expressly forbidden, in
the absence of a mechanism such as RCS which achieves the same
result by other means.
Since an attorney may become responsible for his client's penalty under the RCS rule, one effect of this rule is to bundle the interests of attorneys and clients together. This is certainly contrary
to the expectation that attorney services are independent of client
interests, and that attorney independence is essential to the quality
of the professional services rendered to clients. It is also counter to
the professionalism of the practicing bar. However, the existing
contingency-fee system does bundle lawyer and client interests in
those cases de facto. It is an objective of the RCS rule to discourage
various kinds of litigation, and this would include some cases where
contingency-fee arrangements are prevalent, and others where this
18. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567-74 (4th ed.

1992).
19. See, e.g., Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney
Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1984) (observing that although
American-style contingency-fee arrangements are either prohibited or considered unethical in Europe, existing European rules can produce results that are

very similar to those arising from a contingency arrangement).
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fee arrangement may not be widespread. This rule may result in
the reduction of contingency-fee usage if attorneys become financially responsible for their client's costs in lost cases.
This bundling of interests then recognizes the fact that financial and substantive interests of clients and attorneys are often
joined by the current system. The question of whether such a connection of interests "should" occur is for legislatures to determine.
For purposes of the present analysis, the party actually responsible
for the RCS penalty is the loser, and may include the client, his
attorney, an insurer, or some other third party.
The preceding discussion leads to the question of class-action
suits. These can be accommodated within the framework of the
RCS rule by defining the "winners" or "losers" as the parties whose
names actually appear in the lawsuit. Since class-action litigation
costs are usually borne by other parties, such as the law firms
representing the plaintiffs and all the members of the class,
whatever agreements cover the legal expenses could be extended to
include possible RCS penalties, as in the case of contingency-fee
arrangements.
Having outlined the RCS rule and discussed it in terms of its
purpose and its operation, it becomes essential to examine the impact of this rule in formal terms. The next section explores this aspect of the rule by comparing its effects to those of the American
and the European rules. This should permit a clear understanding
of the differences and similarities of impact among these three
rules.
III.

QUANTITATIVE

RESULTS FOR THE REVERSE-COSTSHIFTING RULE

Here a quantitative description of the reverse-cost-shifting rule
is presented, and the operation of this rule is illustrated with several examples. The objective is to compare the effects of the RCS,
American, and European rules on both the plaintiff and the defendant under a variety of circumstances. It will be shown specifically,
in a simple but realistic cost model, that under RCS either plaintiff
or defendant can be discouraged from litigating if the a priori
probability of winning is less than some pre-assigned value. This
section further demonstrates quantitatively that when a case actually goes to trial, the optimum strategy for each side under RCS is
to limit its costs to those needed to present the essential core of its
case, without resorting to unnecessary over-investment. These features of the RCS rule, as well as others previously mentioned,
emerge from the results presented here.
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This discussion of RCS begins by introducing a model 20 that
applies to a plaintiff 1- suing a defendant A for J dollars. Let G(x)
represent the net amount of money (in dollars) that Fl will gain (or
lose) as a function of his expenditures which are denoted by x.
Under RCS G(x) is given by
G(x) = SP(x)-{x+Cx [1-P(x)]},
(1)
where x = plaintiffs expenditures (in dollars)
P(x) = plaintiffs probability of winning as a
function of x
S = sum (in dollars) plaintiff actually expects to
receive if he wins (which may be different
from J).
Cx = plaintiff's liability under RCS (in dollars)
Since P(x) denotes the a priori probability that 11 wins as a function
of x, [1-P(x)] is the probability that 1I loses. The term SP(x) then
represents the gain expected if 11 wins an amount S with a
probability P(x). This gain is offset by the losses appearing in curly
brackets: These include Ii's direct expenditures x as well as the
RCS penalty Cx which Fl incurs with a probability [1-P(x)]. As
demonstrated below, the "compensation factor" C can be chosen to
ensure that suits with a low probability of being won lead to a negative G(x) for all x. By implication such suits should not be litigated
in the first place, since no expenditure x will lead to a net gain. The
results for the American rule are recovered by setting C = 0. The
European rule must be treated differently, as discussed in detail
below.
20. The notation in the present paper differs from that used by most au-

thors. This is primarily due to the fact that 11 's probability of winning is
treated as a function which depends on his expenditure x, hence the notation
P(x). Similarly A's probability of winning is denoted by P(y), where y is his expenditure. P(x) will depend in turn on the quantities P and x. which are de-

fined in the text, and which have no counterparts in conventional analyses. The
following Table compares the notation of the present paper and the conven-

tional notation for various quantities. N/A indicates that the indicated quantity
does not arise in the corresponding analysis.
Definition

I's probability of winning
-'s expected damages
1H's litigation costs
Hl's costs of settling
H's limiting probability of winning
A's probability of winning
A's expected litigation loss
A's costs of litigating
A's costs of settlement
A's limiting probability of winning

Conventional Symbol
P,
D, or J,
C,
S,
N/A
Pd or 1-P

Our Symbol
P(x)
S
x
N/A
P.
P(y)

Dd or Jd

S

Cd

Y

Sd

N/A

N/A

P
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To complete the analytic model the functional form of P(x) must
be specified. In the real world the plaintiff's probability of winning,
P(x), is likely to be a complicated function of his expenditures x and
other variables, but for present purposes the following simple
parametrization of P(x) will suffice:
(2)
P(x) = P,(1-e-xo),
where P_ and x, are constants, and e is the base of natural logarithms. The quantity x. is the amount that H must spend for P(x) to
reach 0.63 of P-, where 0.63 = 1-1/e is a standard measure of an
exponential decrease. The content of Equation (2) becomes more evident when we consider the two limiting cases,
(3)
X/Xo<<l: P(x)=x(P_/xo),
x/xo>>l: P(x)=P-.

(4)

Equations (2)-(4) incorporate two simplifying assumptions about
P(x): For small x the probability of winning increases linearly with
x, whereas for large x, P(x) approaches a limiting value denoted by
P. The first assumption is reasonable, and assuming some other
dependence for small x (e.g. x 2) does not significantly affect the results. The second assumption incorporates the view that regardless
how much l1 spends, his probability of winning will level out at a
value P. which is determined by the objective facts in the case. (The
fact that P. is not necessarily a 100% probability of winning must
be emphasized.) This is again a plausible simplifying assumption
which can easily be relaxed without materially affecting the stated
conclusions. A plot of P(x) is shown in Figure 1.
The content of Figure 1 can be illustrated as follows: Assume,
as in the figure, that the "best case" probability of winning is 0.5
(i.e., 50%), and consider the curve with x. = 1.0. If the plaintiffs
expenditures x are expressed, for example, in thousands of dollars
then x. = $1,000, and the graph for xo = 1 shows his probability of
winning as a function of x. The figure then indicates that an expenditure of $2,000 leads to a 43% chance of winning, and an expenditure of $3,000 leads to a 48% chance of prevailing. However,
increasing his expenditure to $4,000 (i.e. by 33%) only increases his
probability of winning from 48% to 49%.
The fact that the
probability P(x) eventually reaches a plateau for sufficiently large
values of x, is an important feature of the present model. However,
the specific functional form for P(x) in Equation (2) is not critical,
and another function which has a similar shape will lead to approximately the same results.
To plot G(x) for various cases of interest it is helpful to rewrite
Equation (1) in the form
G(x) = P(x)(S+Cx)-(C+I)x.
(5)
When combined with Equation (2), G(x) expresses the net gain (or
loss) expected by the plaintiff as a function of his expenditure x, and
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FIGURE 1: The probability function P(x). P. is the limiting probability

and x. is the expenditure needed for P(x) to reach 63% of P. The figure
is drawn for P. = 0.5 and x. = 1/4, '/, 1, 4 (in units of dollars). This figure
indicates that a smaller value of x. requires a smaller expenditure in
order for P(x) to reach 63% of its maximum value, which here is
P = 0.5.

the four input parameters S, C, P, and x.. Of these, C is obviously
known, being determined by statute. S, P-, and x,, are more difficult
to determine, depending as they do on the details of each case. In
practice P_ could be identified with the "best-case" probability of
winning under the condition that the plaintiff can spend an unlimited (or "infinite") amount of money. S, P-, and x,, will depend on
numerous factors, such as earlier precedents with similar cases, but
for present purposes a presumption is made that these parameters
can be estimated by the plaintiff and his attorney.
As previously noted, the American rule can be viewed as a special case of RCS in which the compensation factor C is set to zero.
By contrast, the European rule must be treated separately, since
under the European rule the anticipated gain (or loss) for each side
depends on the expenditures of the other party.
The plaintiffs gain function GE(X) under the European rule is
then given by
GE(x) = (S+x)P(x)-{x+y [1-P(x)]}.
(6)
The term (S+x)P(x) represents the expected gain arising (with
probability P(x)) from the sum of the judgment S that the plaintiff
receives and his recovered expenditures x. (The latter contribution
is, of course, not present in either the RCS or American rules.) The
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terms in curly brackets, which enter with an overall negative sign,
represent the loss contributions to GE(x). These include fi's own expenditures x, as well as his obligation to reimburse A's expenses y,
which he does with probability [1-P(x)]. The presence in H's gain
function GE(X) of a term proportional to A's expenditures y is what
distinguishes the formal analysis of the European rule from the
analysis of both the RCS and American rules. Since A's expenditure
(y) is not under the control of FI,GE(x) must be computed for a range
of values of y, as shown in the accompanying figures.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 exhibit G(x) and GE(X) for various assumed
values of the parameters. S has been arbitrarily set at S = 10, and
it has been further assumed that x, = 1 which fixes x,/S at a reasonable value 0.1. In terms of the example presented in analyzing Figure 1, S = 10 corresponds to a plaintiff expecting to receive $10,000,
and x,=1 means that an assumption has been made that the plaintiff must spend $1,000 to have a 63% chance of reaching his limiting
probability P_ As previously noted, P_ will depend in turn on the
details of the specific case, and on other factors such as previous
court decisions. For present purposes, exhibited below are the rePlaintiff's Analysis (Limiting Probability
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P . = 0.8, under the
RCS, American, and European rules. This figure, and all the remaining results, assume S = 10, x = 1 and C = 1. Note that the results for
G(x) under RCS are very similar to those arising from the existing
American rule. The results for the European rule are shown for different assumed values of the defendant's expenditure y. See text for further details.
FIGURE 2: The plaintiffs gain function G(x) for
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sults for three representative situations, P_ = 0.8, P_ = 0.5, and P_ =
0.2.
For the European rule, the results for four values of y have
been exhibited. Figure 2 indicates that the results for G(x) under
the RCS rule are very similar to those that obtain under the existing American rule when P_ = 0.8. This reflects the important feature of the RCS rule that its consequences differ little from those of
the American rule when F1has a strong case (i.e., where the a priori
probability of losing is small.) Note that under both rules G(x) becomes negative as x approaches S (here set at 10), since for x > 10,
fl's expenditures would exceed his return should he win.
The results for the RCS and American rules are significantly
different from those of the European rule when P = 0.8. Figure 2
shows that there is no expenditure x in the indicated range for
which GE(x) becomes negative under the European rule. (However,
GE(x) can become negative for sufficiently large x.) This means that,
for the assumed parameters, the European plaintiff has little incentive to restrict his own spending, in contrast to what obtains under
either the RCS or American rules. Moreover, these results indicate
a feature that is common to all of the figures, namely, that RCS
provides the strongest disincentive for the plaintiff (or defendant) to
over-invest in his case. This can be seen in Figure 2 by noting that
for a given set of parameters (i.e., a given curve), the optimum expenditure x corresponds to the peak in each curve. This peak typically occurs at the smallest value of x for RCS, since only under
RCS is the penalty for losing based on each party's own expenditures. This is seen most clearly in Figure 3, which compares the
different rules for the circumstance where the limiting probability
P_ is 0.5. This figure shows that the peak of G(x) occurs at the
smallest values of x for RCS, followed in turn by the American and
European rules. Note that when Fl's limiting probability is 0.5, the
European rule encourages a higher optimum investment by FI, compared to the RCS and American rules.
The differences among the American, RCS, and European rules
emerge most clearly when the limiting probability P_ is small. This
is shown in Figure 4 for the case P_ = 0.2, with all other parameters
having the same values as before. Consider first a comparison of the
RCS and American results. The figure indicates that even when P.
is as small as 0.2, under the American rule G(x) remains positive
for x < 1.6. This means that it would pay for the plaintiff to litigate
such a case, provided that he kept his expenses low. By contrast,
under the RCS rule (with C = 1) G(x) is always negative (for all
values of x). It follows that under the RCS rule, cases where P_ is
0.2 (or less) would never be filed since no expenditure x would likely
lead to a net positive return. The RCS rule thus operates to remove
from the system cases for which P_ is below some threshold value,
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3: The plaintiffs gain function G(x) for P_ = 0.5. See caption to
Figure 2 for further details.
FIGURE

Plaintiff's Analysis (Limiting Probability = 0.2)

FIGURE 4: The plaintiffs gain function G(x) for P_ = 0.2. Notice that
under RCS, G(x) is negative for all x. It follows that under RCS no
expenditure x would likely lead to a positive return, and hence such
cases should not be filed in the first place. By contrast, a net positive
gain is possible under the American rule. For a discussion of the European rule, see text and caption to Figure 2.
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by ensuring that G(x) < 0. This threshold value can be controlled by
an appropriate statutory choice of C.
The differences among the RCS, American, and European rules
can be illustrated in another way by continuing the previous example in which II is suing A for $10,000. Figure 4 indicates that even
when Ii's limiting (i.e. "best case") probability is as low as 0.2 (20%),
it pays for him to litigate under the American rule. In fact rl's optimum strategy, corresponding to the peak in the top curve of Figure
4, is to invest $690 in his case which will then led to a net gain of
$310. (In terms of the graph, under the American rule the maximum value of G(x) is 0.31 which occurs at x = 0.69.) In contrast, the
results for RCS using the same assumptions, with C=1 set by statute, indicate that G(x) is negative for all values of x. This means
that II would experience a net loss regardless of what he spent,
which loss would increase the greater his expenditure. In practice
this would mean that any case in which the limiting probability was
20% or less would simply not be filed, and hence all such cases
would be removed from the courts under RCS.
Figure 4 also clearly demonstrates the differences between the
RCS and European rules. The graphs show that GE(x) is negative
for most values of x and y under the European rule, and so the
plaintiff would presumably be discouraged from filing such a suit in
the first place, just as he would under RCS. However, if such a suit
were filed (for some non-monetary reason), the optimum fI strategy
under the European rule would be to invest the amount x corresponding to the peak of each curve, whereas under RCS the optimum strategy would be to invest nothing at all. This point is again
discussed below when the defendant's strategies are compared
under the different rules.
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate how the choice of C influences
which cases are effectively removed from the court system. Figure 5
indicates that with C'- 1 cases with P_ = 0.2 or less would result in
G(x) being negative for any expenditure x, as already noted. For P
= 0.3 or greater, G(x) would be positive for some values of x but,
given the uncertainties in estimates of P-, filing a case with P_ = 0.3
would not be recommended. Figure 5 also indicates that for larger
values of P_ an appropriate investment in such a case could be
worthwhile. Figure 6 suggests similar conclusions when P. is fixed
and C is allowed to vary. The larger the value of C (for a given P-),
the less the plaintiff can invest before G(x) becomes negative.
Next the RCS, American, and European rules are analyzed
from the point of view of the defendant A. To avoid notational confusion, A's expenditures are denoted by y, and his probability of
winning by P(y),
P(y) = P(1-e-Y'Yo),
(7)
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FIGURE 5: Plot of G(x) as a function of x for different choices of the
limiting probability P_, which is denoted by P in the legend. The
graphs are drawn for C=1. As noted in the text, G(x) is always negative when P. is 0.2 or'less and hence such cases would never be filed
under the RCS rule.
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Figure 6: Plot of G(x) as a function of x for different choices of the compensation factor C. For P. fixed at the value 0.5, a larger compensation factor
encourages a smaller optimum investment x, corresponding to the peak of
each curve.
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where,
P_ = defendant's limiting probability of winning
yo = expenditure (in dollars) required to achieve 63% of P_
Since P(x) and P(y) are being evaluated separately by H-and A, it is
not necessarily the case that [P(x) + P(y)] = 1, or even that [P- + P-1
= 1, as might naively be expected. If P(x) and P(y) were being estimated simultaneously by a disinterested third party, then one could
reasonably impose the constraint that the sum of the probabilities
for H and A winning is 100% (i.e. , 1.0). However, this is not the
situation contemplated here. Similarly, the defendant is free to assume that if he were to lose, the judgment against him would be an
amount S which is not necessarily the same as either the amount J
being asked by the plaintiff, or the amount S that the plaintiff actually expects to receive.
The functional dependence of G(y) on y can be obtained following the analogous discussion for G(x). Since A gains nothing if he
wins, the analog of Equation (1) for A is
G(y) = -y-(Cy+S)[1-P(y)] = {(S+Cy)P(y)-(C+1)y}-S.
(8)
The first part of Equation (8) incorporates the statement that A
must pay out not only his expenses y, but also the sum of the judgment S and the RCS penalty Cy if he loses, which he does with
probability [1-P(y)]. Note that G(y) is always negative, so the best
that A can achieve is to minimize his expected losses. Since the expression in curly brackets in Equation (8) has the same functional
form as for G(x) in Equation (5), A's results can be obtained from H's
results by shifting the latter down (i.e. subtracting) the amount S.
The resulting graphs are shown in Figures 7, 8, and 9. Figure 9
indicates that for C = 1 and P_ = 0.2 any expenditure of funds
merely increases the defendant's losses, so he would presumably
settle without litigating. By contrast, under the American rule, the
expenditure of a small amount of money would be justified,
notwithstanding the very low probability of success.
These results can again be illustrated by continuing the same
example being considered. Suppose that l and A agree that the
amount in dispute is $10,000, and that A has only a 20% chance of
prevailing at trial. As noted above, under RCS A would have a
strong incentive to not litigate. This is not the case under the
American rule. Figure 9 indicates that A's optimum strategy (corresponding to the peak of the top curve) is to invest $690 in his defense, in which case his losses would be cut from $10,000 to $9,690.

The RCS rule allows society to discourage such a strategy in the
interest of not burdening the courts with such "one-sided" cases.
The defendant's gain function GE(y) under the European rule
can be written down by following the discussion leading to Equation
(6), and the result is
GE(Y) = yP(y)-{y+[1-P(y)](S+x)}.

(9)
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FIGURE 7: The defendant's gain function G(y) for P = 0.8. In this and

the remaining figures, it is assumed that S = 10, C = 1, and y. = 1. See
text for further discussion.

The first term represents the recovery of A's expenses y if he wins,
which he does with probability P(y). The losses include A's expenses
y, along with the sum of the judgment S and 11's expenses x, which
A is liable for with probability [1-P(y)]. For computational purposes
it is convenient to rewrite Equation (9) in the form
GE(Y) = -(S+x+y)[1-P(y)].
(10)
The results for the European rule are shown along with those
of the RCS and American rules in Figures 7, 8, and 9. The results
for the defendant's analysis mirror those for the plaintiffs analysis,
with one notable exception: Since the decision to litigate belongs to
F1 and not A, the defendant has no alternative but to choose the
optimum strategy dictated by the appropriate curve in Figures 7-9.
When P. = 0.2, depicted in Figure 9, Il's decision to litigate not only
forces A to invest in his case, but ensures that he will on average
lose more than he would under RCS. As already noted, A's optimum strategy under RCS would be to settle without litigating,
which is not the case for the European rule.
This formal discussion illustrates the effect of the RCS rule in
comparison with the existing American and European rules. It also
indicates the type of impact this proposal might have on litigation
decisions in situations where the other two rules would produce different outcomes. The discussion in the next section presents a more
detailed qualitative comparison of the RCS, American, and Euro-
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FIGURE 8: The defendant's gain function 0(y) for P_ = 0.5. See caption
to Figure 7 for further details.
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pean rules from the perspective of various issues that arise when
cost allocation rules are debated.
IV.

COMPARISON OF COST ALLOCATION RULES

This section discusses a comparison of the RCS, American, and
European rules for cost shifting (i.e., for allocating legal expenses).
One way of framing this comparison is to ask whether there exists
(even in principle) an "ideal" allocation system. This question is
necessarily vague, since "ideal" is an imprecise term. Nevertheless,
a set of characteristics that such a system might embody is proposed, and then the question is asked whether any of the three allocation systems incorporates all of these features. The following
discussion exhibits a collection of such criteria which, although not
exhaustive, are sufficient to support the conjecture that an ideal
cost allocation system may not exist. The criteria for such a system
are outlined below.
1) The "winning"party should be made "whole".
This is one of the principal justifications for the European rule.
However, the European rule is hard to justify when a case arises
from a good faith mutual disagreement, 2 ' when the courts themselves are divided on a point of view, or when the outcome would
have been difficult to predict, as in sui generis cases. Since both
parties in such cases can claim to be acting in good faith, there is
little justification for levying an additional penalty (i.e. on top of the
judgment itself) against the loser. Hence this criterion, although
reasonable, is no more compelling than the others presented below.
2) Frivolous or vexatious actions should be discouraged.
This would seem to be self-evident, except that what is "frivolous" to one party may be justified to the opponent. However, underlying all allocation rules is the assumption that each party can
determine within reason how an objective third party (e.g. a jury)
would view the strengths and weaknesses of each side's case, even
if the actual damages and liability cannot be determined objectively
in advance by the parties.
3) Large disparities in the resources of the opposing parties
should not lead to unequal justice.
This is part of the rationale for the American rule. It reflects
the view that all parties should have equal access to the courts regardless of their economic circumstances. This criterion can be
summarized by the notion that the courts should attempt to "level
the playing field" for the opposing parties. The European rule is an
example of an "uneven playing field," since the threat of having to
pay the legal fees of a party with substantial resources can deter a
21. Pfennigstorf, supra note 19, at 67.
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smaller party from pursuing its case, even when that case is meritorious. Both the American and RCS rules are attempts to "level the
playing field," relative to what would obtain under the European
22
rule.
4) Opposingparties should be deterred from engaging in excess
investment.
This is one of the rationales for the reverse-cost-shifting proposal. An "excess" could be defined as an effort or expenditure which
does not materially increase the gain function G(x) or 0(y) for the
plaintiff or defendant respectively. Moreover, parties should be encouraged to expedite litigation to reduce both the cost and time involved. This objective can be viewed as important to conserving
society's (as well as litigants') resources.
5) The courts should be supported by those who use them.
This is another rationale for the reverse-cost-shifting proposal.
Just as other public services, such as the state motor vehicle bureau, are at least partially self-supporting, so should the courts be,
at least for civil actions. It should be noted that there is an alternate view, which holds that the courts are a service whose decisions
benefit all of society, not just the litigants themselves. On this view
the courts should be funded by general tax revenues. In reality,
courts can be (and are) funded by both taxes and payments of vari23
ous sorts by individual parties.
6) Out-of-court settlements should be encouraged.
Since litigation raises the cost of settling a case, which cost is
ultimately borne by society as a whole, it is preferable that cases be
settled out of court. This conserves various resources both of the
parties and of society.
7) Cost allocation rules should strive for judicial consistency
and predictability.
One of the objections to the European rule is the arbitrariness
in deciding which expenses of the winning party should be paid by
the losing side. By contrast, under reverse cost shifting each side's
exposure is known since it is determined by their own expenses.
8) Socially useful litigation should be encouraged.
24
This incorporates the idea of the "private attorney general."
Of course, it is often difficult to determine at the time a lawsuit is
instituted which cases warrant being included in this category, or
who should make such a determination. However, such generally
22. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
23. The literature relating to adjudication and the settlement of disputes in

public and private good contexts is presented in a Seminar by Henry G. Manne,
Private Alternatives to the Judicial Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (1979).
24. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 241
(1975).
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beneficial litigation might be recognized and rewarded in some
manner.
The entries in Table I for criteria 1 and 2 are obvious, where it
is understood that the entry for the American rule in 2 indicates
that there is no additional "penalty" beyond the litigant's own direct costs. For criterion 3, the entry under the European rule reflects what would obtain in the absence of provisions which waive
the European rule in special circumstances, e.g., for individuals suing large corporations. The rule can sometimes be waived at the
discretion of the trial judge, which is the origin of the entry for criterion 7. The entries for criterion 4 reflect the additional disincentive arising from RCS, over and above the obvious desire of each
party to minimize its own costs. The entries for criterion 5 are obvious, since only RCS provides for a systematic mechanism under
which the users support the courts. The entries under criterion 6
relate to the additional incentive to settle provided under both the
European and RCS rules by the imposition of their respective penalties. Criterion 7 deals with the issue of consistency with respect to
the imposition of penalties for court costs. Under both the American
and RCS rules, the obligations of the losing parties are clear. In
contrast, the losing party's obligations under the European rule are
less clear, since further court proceedings may be necessary to determine the actual assessment against the losing party. The entry
under the American rule for criterion 8 is not to suggest that litigation is actually encouraged, as much as to suggest that it is not discouraged in comparison to the European and RCS rules.
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF COST-SHIFTING RULES

a

Rule
Criterion
1. winner made "whole"
2.

frivolous actions discouraged

3. "level playing field"
4.

discourage excess investment

5. users support courts
6. settlements encouraged
7.
8.

judicial consistencyb
encourage "socially useful"
litigation

RCS

American

European

NO

YES

NO

NOb
NO

YES
Nob
NO

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO

NO
YES

YES
YES

YES
YESb

Nob
NO

YES
NO

YES

For each of the criteria described in the text, YES indicates that it is embodied in
the corresponding rule and NO indicates that it is not. See text for further
discussion.
b See text for further discussion.

None of the three rules achieves all of the criteria outlined

above. This is in part a consequence of the fact that these criteria
are actually mutually exclusive. For example, consider what would

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:35

happen under RCS2 where the loser would pay the winner rather
than the court. On the one hand RCS2 would achieve criterion 1,
which is not the case under the RCS rule as formulated. In this
version of the rule the winning party would recover at least some of
its expenditures (and perhaps more than it actually spent). However, RCS2 is incompatible with both criteria 4 and 5, contrary to
what obtains under the RCS formulation. The failure to satisfy 5 is
obvious, and 4 would be compromised by the "windfall" problem
discussed in Section II.
Although one cannot exclude the possibility that another cost
allocating rule might achieve all of these criteria, Table I and the
preceding discussion of RCS2 suggest that this is unlikely. The situation with respect to cost allocation rules might then be similar to
that for voting systems, which have been shown by Arrow's analysis 2 5 to be plagued by various undesirable features. Since none of
the existing or proposed cost allocation rules is "ideal," the best alternative is the one with the most desirable features (or the fewest
undesirable ones). In this sense, Table I suggests that RCS may be
a viable alternative to the American and European rules. Moreover,
since the compensation factor C can be adjusted incrementally over
a period of years by policy makers, RCS could be phased in over a
sufficiently long period to ensure a smooth transition from the existing American rule to RCS. Additionally, by appropriately choosing C, RCS could become a valuable policy mechanism for
controlling the flow of litigation into American courts.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Allocation rules which deal with attorneys' fees and other litigation costs have a direct impact on society, the judicial system,
and the litigants themselves. This analysis develops an alternative
cost allocation rule, reverse-cost-shifting (RCS), and systematically
compares this rule with the American and European rules. In the
simplest of terms the effect of RCS is to "tilt the legal playing field"
in favor of the party that has the more legitimate (stronger) case.
This is achieved by penalizing the losing party both for bringing (or
defending) a weak case, and for overinvesting in that case. It is
important to emphasize that in favoring the party with the stronger
case, it is immaterial whether that party is the plaintiff or defendant, or whether the party is big or small in size or in resources.
Thus, an individual bringing a legitimate product liability suit
against a corporation would be significantly better off under RCS
than under the existing American rule, since RCS would provide a
disincentive for the corporation to defend or drag out the case. Of
25. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUE

(2d ed. 1951).
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course, the reverse would be true if the individual were bringing a
non-meritorious case against the same corporation.
The choice among different rules should depend on a number of
factors which include the objective of each rule, its impact, and its
operation. While other authors have addressed these issues for the
American and European rules, the focus of this article has been on
the RCS rule and its impact. This rule is designed to produce two
different and important results. First, it will reduce the amount of
litigation that could be characterized as marginal, i.e., where a litigant has little chance of prevailing even with the investment of substantial resources. Thus the RCS rule might remove from the court
system a portion of its current workload that does not serve a public
good or produce other system-wide benefits. Second, the penalty
paid by the losing party supports the court system itself, instead of
reimbursing the prevailing party. By having the court become the
recipient of the RCS penalty, not only is the "windfall" problem discussed in Section II solved, but it is also ensured that the users of
the courts help support their operation.
In addition to presenting the RCS rule for allocating litigation
costs, this analysis has provided a systematic comparison of the effects of all three allocation rules. 26 The European rule encourages
the litigation of strong claims, but clearly discourages litigating
weak ones. The RCS rule provides similar incentives and disincentives for litigating. In addition, it provides the strongest disincentives for a party over-investing in its case. Among the three rules,
the American rule is most likely to encourage litigation when the
litigant lacks a clear or realistic chance of winning.
The three rules are also quite different from the point of view of
their operation or administration. While the American rule requires no implementation, since each party simply absorbs its own
costs, the European rule can be quite cumbersome to administer. It
is riddled with exceptions and often requires secondary proceedings
to determine and assess reasonable costs on the loser. The RCS rule
has several attractive features including the capability of being implemented gradually by increasing the compensation factor C over
a period of years. In addition, the RCS rule is compatible with existing practices relating to contingency-fee arrangements. Yet, at
the same time, RCS works in the direction of discouraging some
types of lawsuits that would otherwise be encouraged by such arrangements. The structure and formulation of the RCS rule would
allow legislatures to apply the rule in selected areas, to set C at
different values in appropriate situations, and to adjust the rule
26. See Attorney Fees and LitigationExpenses in Selected Foreign Nations,
L. LIBR. CONG. REP. LL 95-2 (Mar. 1995) (discussing attorney fees and litigation
expense under the European rule).
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from time-to-time to achieve the desired results. The flexibility of
RCS, and its deterrent effects on litigation, suggest that the RCS
rule may be a viable alternative to both the American and European rules.
This article concludes by briefly considering the likely economic
impact of RCS were it to be enacted into law. As previously noted,
the aim of RCS is to reduce both the number of lawsuits filed and
the cost of each one. It is then fair to suppose that one effect of RCS
would be to reduce the aggregate annual expenditure on litigation
compared to what exists at present, and to thus curb what has been
termed the "litigation explosion." 2 7 Since RCS is completely neutral
with respect to its impact on plaintiffs and defendants, and with
respect to big and small parties, this reduction in litigation expenditure could be achieved in an evenhanded way. RCS would thus encourage the law industry to join other sectors of society such as the
medical profession, private industry, government, universities, and
the defense industry, in working to increase efficiency and to reduce
unnecessary costs.
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